The Ethiopian Prospective Case by Joireman, Sandra F. & Szayna, Thomas S,
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2000
The Ethiopian Prospective Case
Sandra F. Joireman
University of Richmond, sjoirema@richmond.edu
Thomas S, Szayna
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
"The Ethiopian Prospective Case." In Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model, edited by Thomas S. Szayna,
193-237. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.
Chapter Five 
THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECTIVE CASE 
Sandra F. Joireman and Thomas S. Szayna 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter applies the "process" model for anticipating the inci-
dence of ethnic conflict to the potential case of the emergence of 
ethnically based violence in Ethiopia. Therefore, in contrast to the 
two case studies presented previously, this case entails the use of the 
model to consider prospectively the likelihood of an ethnic mobi-
lization turning violent. The chapter examines the case of Ethiopia 
from the perspective of what an intelligence analyst might conclude 
were she to use the "process" model. In essence, we look at the 
potential ethnic mobilization of the Amhara against the Tigray-
dominated Ethiopian state structures in an attempt to alter the polit-
ical arrangements governing Ethiopia more in favor of the Amhara. 
Data available as of 1997-1998 were used to conduct this analysis. 
The choice of Ethiopia as a case study is in no way meant to suggest 
that this country is somehow predetermined to slide into ethnic ten-
sions or strife. The choice was. made on the basis of geographical 
diversity (as other case studies examine different regions of the 
world) and the country's regional importance. 
Through the use of the model, the chapter examines the potential 
grievances the Amhara might have against the state and the likely 
path that their mobilization might take. Two secondary scenarios 
examine the potential ethnic mobilization of the Oromo and the 
Somali against the Tigray-dominated state, the potential paths of the 
two mobilization processes, and the likelihood of strife that may 
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result. This orientation is in line with the focus of the "process" 
model on one particular kind of ethnic conflict, namely, the rise of an 
ethnic group challenging the state. 
The reason for selecting the Amhara challenge as the main scenario 
stems partly from the specific influence that the Amhara have had in 
Ethiopia in the past, their substantial population, and some evidence 
of ongoing attempts at mobilization. The secondary scenarios exam-
ine the other main ethnic group (the Oromo) and a group (the 
Somali) that is minor in terms of population but historically trouble-
some to Ethiopian state authorities. The authors emphasize that, at 
this point of its development, the model is intended to be more sug-
gestive than predictive. Neither the choice of the scenarios nor the 
potential outcomes examined should be taken to imply that the 
groups in question will mobilize against the government or that 
confrontation with the state necessarily will result in violence. 
As presented in the model, the group-versus-state conflict is the 
simplest form of ethnic competition and, some may argue, not real-
istic when applied to the multiethnic conditions of Ethiopia. The 
authors do not deny the obvious influence that any open Amhara-
Tigray competition may have on the behavior of the Oromo toward 
the state and other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. However, the authors 
believe that, for the purposes of outlining in a parsimonious manner 
the basic preferences that the state and the Amhara would have, the 
model is sufficient. And the model is sufficiently flexible to allow 
taking into account other groups' impact upon the dyad in conflict if 
the impact is likely to be major. Finally, it is not clear whether the 
advantages of a multigroup model would outweigh the complexity 
and probable difficulty of its use. 
Following the organization of the previous two chapters, four sec-
tions follow this introduction. The first section examines the struc-
ture of closure and provides an analysis of which ethnic groups 
appear to be privileged and which seem underrepresented in struc-
tures of power (the demographic characteristics of Ethiopia in 1997-
1998, on which the analysis is based, are appended at the end of the 
chapter). Then it examines the strengths and weaknesses of the 
challenging ethnic group-the Amhara-by looking at its potential 
mobilization process. A shorter analysis of the secondary scenarios 
is included. The second section looks at the capabilities the state-
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federal Ethiopia-might bring to bear in dealing with the challenging 
groups. The third section examines the strategic choices, arrived at 
on the basis of the assessments in earlier sections, that the state and 
the group are likely to pursue vis-a-vis each other, given their 
resource bases. Finally, a few observations conclude the chapter. 
ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE 
Closure in the Political and Security Realms 
Since 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF)-the current party of government in the Ethiopian Parlia-
ment-has made an effort to open cabinet-level leadership and the 
composition of the army to other ethnic groups, but such measures 
are widely perceived as less than genuine or an outright sham. When 
the EPRDF won the Ethiopian civil war in 1991, it was a predomi-
nantly Tigrayan organization (having recently changed its name from 
the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, or TPLF).1 One method the 
EPRDF used to broaden its ethnic representation was to establish 
"friendly" coalition parties, drawing representation from each ethnic 
group. However, the ethnic parties are not necessarily representative 
of their respective ethnic groups. For example, the Oromo People's 
Democratic Organization (OPDO), formed to represent the Oromo 
people within the EPRDF coalition, was originally composed of cap-
tured Oromo POWs and officers. The OPDO is viewed with suspicion 
by many Oromo because of its origins and closeness to the EPRDF. 
Its main rival in representing the interests of the Oro mo people is the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a much older and well-established 
resistance army and political party.2 This pattern of newly estab-
lished EPRDF-affiliated groups, challenging older, rival parties to 
represent ethnic interests, is repeated in other areas. 
Regional and national elections of Ethiopia's highest-ranking politi-
cal authorities took place in May and June 1995. The president has 
1 For a history of the TPLF, see John Young, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Libera-
tion Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism," Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, pp. 105-120. 
2There are also other smaller groups such as the Oromo National Liberation Front, 
which draw support from the Oromo population. 
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mainly ceremonial powers and is elected by the Council of People's 
Representatives. The prime minister holds most of the executive 
functions. The prime minister, elected by the Council of People's 
Representatives, appoints the 17-member Council of Ministers 
(subject to approval by the legislature). See Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Representation within the highest levels of the government-the 
Council of Ministers and the legislature-is ethnically diverse, but 
the true nature of power sharing is not clear. See Table 5.3. At least 
five Tigrayan assistant ministers may have direct access to the prime 
minister, which casts some suspicion on the true integration of the 
Table5.l 
Top Ethiopian Officials 
Position 
Prime Minister 
President 
Secretary of the Council of the 
People's Representatives 
Speaker of the Council of the 
People's Representatives 
Name 
Meles Zenawi 
N egasso Gidada 
Hailu Hailifom 
Dawit Yohannes 
Table5.2 
Ethnicity 
Tigrayan 
Oro mo 
Tigrayan 
Amhara 
Council of Ministers, Ethnic Breakdown 
Ethnic Number of Percent of 
Group Ministers Ministers 
Oro mo 4 24 
Am hara 4 24 
Gurage 2 12 
Ti gray 6 
Harari 1 6 
Kembata 1 6 
Somali 6 
Afar 6 
Weleyta 6 
Hadiya 6 
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council.3 In the legislature, the representation of various ethnic 
groups is large, but the overwhelming majority of the members of 
parliament (slightly over 90 percent) are from EPRDF-affiliated par-
ties. Each region, which is ethnically defined, is allocated a certain 
number of seats within the parliament. Typically, political parties 
nominally controlled by local ethnic groups but under the EPRDF 
umbrella have taken these seats. This is due, at least in part, to the 
opposition boycott of the 1995 parliamentary election, in which most 
of the opposition parties declared themselves unwilling to partici-
pate. 4 Thus, the parliamentary seats have been filled with people 
representing their particular ethnic group, yet there is substantial 
room for doubt as to just how much these MPs are trusted by most 
members of their ethnic groups. 
Table5.3 
Representation in Government by Linguistic Affiliation 
Number and Percent Representation by 
of House Seats Political Party; 
Speakers (100,000s); Reserved for Their Percent of Total 
Language Percent of Total Region (n = 548) House 
Amhara 15 (28.5) 147 (27) 144 (26) 
Oro mo 14 (26.6) 187 (34) 182 (33) 
Tigray 4 (7.6) 40 (7.3) 40 (7.3) 
Weleyta 2 (3.8) NA 13 (0.4) 
Somali 2 (3.8) 25 (4.6) 0 
Gurage 1.5 (2.9) NA 19 (3.5) 
Hadiya 1 (1.9) NA 9 (1.6) 
Kembata l (1.9) NA 5 (l.O) 
Afar 0.5 (1) 8 (1.5) 8 (1.5) 
Harari (Aderi) 0.03 (0.06) 1 (0.2) l (0.2) 
3
"Looking Federal," Africa Confidential, September 22, 1995, p. 5. 
4Their motive for doing so seems to have been threefold: (1) to withhold legitimacy 
from the current government, (2) to protest restrictions placed on opposition access to 
the print and television media, and (3) to protest the repression that some opposition 
parties faced in the more remote areas of the country. See Terrence Lyons, "Closing 
the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia," Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, pp. 121-142. Lyons documents reports of restrictions on 
OLF political activities in the countryside. 
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Data on the ethnicity of national director-level managers are not 
available. Before the regime change Amhara were overrepresented 
in such positions, and that situation may still persist. But based on 
the policies of the government to equalize opportunities among 
ethnic groups, there may be a lessening of the Amhara influence over 
the director-level management of national institutional structures. 
The opposite is true at the regional level, where information is avail-
able. In the regions there is a significant bias toward employing 
people of each region's dominant ethnic group. For example, in the 
Southern People's Region there has been an attempt to promote 
members oflocal ethnic groups into the offices of judge and prosecu-
tor.5 
In terms of closure in the security realm, top positions are dominated 
by Tigrayans and Amharas. The top security authorities in the coun-
try are the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, who both controls his own 
personal security retinue and serves as the commander-in-chief of 
the armed forces; the acting minister of justice, Worede-Wold 
Wolde,6 who controls the police force; and the minister of defense, 
Teferra Walwa, an Amhara who supervises the armed forces. Kinfe 
Gebremedhin, a Tigrayan and the former chief of security, controls 
the Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority, which pre-
viously was the Ministry of Internal Security. Kinfe Gebremedhin re-
ports directly to the prime minister, Mel es Zenawi. 7 
The minister of defense, Teferra Walwa, the highest-ranking security 
official, is a member of the Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM, an Amhara party under the EPRDF umbrella). He replaced 
the previous minister of defense Tamirat Layne, who was fired very 
publicly on charges of corruption. Beyond the ministerial level, there 
is little information available about key security officials. In addition, 
the administrative responsibilities of some of the security agencies 
are not clear. For example, the role of Kinfe Gebremedhin at the 
benignly labeled Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Author-
ity remains to be fully understood and yet is a key to determining the 
5s. F. Joireman, interview with SPR court officials, Yirgalem, 1994. 
6Justice Minister Mahetema Solomon resigned in June 1997. 
7 "Looking Federal," 1995. 
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relative power and control of the security apparati. As the former 
chief of security for the TPLF and as someone with direct access to 
the prime minister, his role in internal security affairs most likely 
equals or surpasses those of the ministers of defense and justice. 
Indeed, his placement as head of the agency responsible for internal 
security is an indication that the prime minister has viewed the 
greatest threat to the Ethiopian state to be internal rather than 
external. 
Similarly, the ethnic makeup of the individuals who form the upper 
levels of the security apparati is not publicly known. The Ethiopian 
military has made well-publicized efforts to diversify the ethnic 
composition of the lower levels of the armed forces, but it is not clear 
to what extent, if any, this diversification has occurred in the officer 
corps. In 1995, only three of the military's nine generals were 
Tigrayan. 8 However, Tigrayans are known to be widely represented 
in the officer corps. 
Assessment of closure in the political and security realms. Closure 
in Ethiopia is based more on political opinion than ethnicity. The 
government has attempted to incorporate members of different 
ethnic groups into its political fold, but only insofar as they agree 
with the government platform and agenda. The Oromo provide an 
important illustration. Those Oromo affiliated with the pro-govern-
ment faction, the OPDO, are represented in national and regional 
governments. Those in the anti-government faction (OLF members 
and supporters) are not represented in either chamber of the legisla-
ture and did not stand for election. We have no way of measuring 
support for the two Oromo factions. However, there are reports that 
at least some Oromo view the OPDO as "seriously compromised" 
due to its affiliation with the EPRDF.9 
Unfortunately, information on the exact ethnic composition of the 
Ethiopian armed forces, both enlisted and officers, is not readily 
available. Additionally, there are no data on the composition of the 
regional police forces. 
8u.s. Department of State, "Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 
1996," Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, January 30, 
1997, http://www.state.gov/wwwlissueslhuman_rightsll 996_hrp _report/ethiopia.html. 
9Lyons, "Closing the Transition," 1996. 
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Since there are no formal restrictions on access to power in political 
or security spheres, the static snapshot of the Ethiopian system pre-
sented above appears to be dynamic enough to accommodate 
change. Indeed, the government has gone out of its way to be inclu-
sive of individuals of other ethnic groups willing to cooperate with its 
political agenda. Ethnically based parties opposed to the EPRDF, 
however, face informal government pressure, general harassment, 
and a denial of access to the media. 
A formal process for the replacement of political elites-including a 
challenge along ethnic lines-exists, but opposition groups have not 
taken the opportunity, restricted though it may be, to express their 
dissent through the electoral process. Opposition groups have 
repeatedly refused to participate in elections, the most recent of 
which occurred in 1995.10 This has placed both the government and 
the country in an odd position. There is a means to replace the 
current ruling group, but thus far the opposition has made no con-
certed attempt to take advantage of it; since the means has not been 
tested, its genuineness is unclear. 
There are informal barriers to political participation. There is some 
suppression of overt dissent in Ethiopia. 11 The threat of government 
intolerance to political opposition is real, highlighted by the 
assassination or imprisonment of vocal opposition leaders within 
Ethiopia. The government appears willing to tolerate quiet and rea-
soned dissent, but when the opposition becomes passionate, the au-
thorities crack down. 
There are no formal rules restricting the access of any ethnic group to 
power at a national level in Ethiopia. But informally, EPRDF has 
made no secret of its desire to keep a monopoly on power. More-
over, as stated earlier, within the regions there is an explicit prefer-
ence for officials from ethnic groups indigenous to the regions. 
10s. F. Joireman, "Opposition Politics in Ethiopia: We Will All Go Down Together," 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 1997. 
11There have been two notable instances of repression of dissent under the current 
government, both involving demonstrations by university students. The first occurred 
in 1991 shortly after the EPRDF entered the capital, and the second occurred in March 
1997. "University Students Released," Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa), March 28, 1997. 
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Individuals from minority groups within regions will experience bar-
riers to government or administrative services. 
Closure in the Economic Realm 
There is very little subnational data available on the economic sector 
in Ethiopia. The results of the 1994 census, if they are ever fully pub-
lished, may shed more light on the topic. Agriculture is the founda-
tion of the Ethiopian economy. It accounts for approximately 43 
percent of the gross domestic product and most of the country's ex-
port income. It is the primary source of employment in the country: 
80 percent of Ethiopians are engaged in it. Apart from farming, the 
state apparatus and the military are the next-greatest sources of em-
ployment in the country.12 
There is no explicit information available on the distribution of 
income within Ethiopia. Keeping in mind that neither farming, 
working for the government, nor being a soldier pay particularly well, 
we can guess that the upper tier of the Ethiopian economy is com-
posed of people who are engaged in business pursuits. We can also 
posit that the wealthiest in the society are urban Amhara (because 
the majority of the educated, urban dwellers in Ethiopia are 
Amhara).13 
Although there are no official figures available on the distribution of 
wealth in the population as a whole or with regard to ethnicity, the 
population of Ethiopia is generally extremely poor. The World 
Bank's estimate of the Ethiopian GNP per capita in 1996 (latest avail-
able) was $ll0, placing the country among the poorest in the world, 
at about the level of Somalia and Bangladesh. 
However, we can make a few general observations about relative 
wealth. First, because coffee is grown as a cash crop in the south, 
12World Bank, From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996, p.188. 
13Recent census information puts the Amhara population at 49 percent of the total 
population of Addis Ababa. Transitional Government of Ethiopia Office of the 
Population and Housing Census Commission, Central Statistical Authority, The 1994 
Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia Results for Addis Ababa, Volume I-Statis-
tical Abstract, Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, 1995. 
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southern peasants who grow coffee are slightly better off than their 
northern counterparts. Those lucky enough to have a college educa-
tion or a job in the capital city or another urban center are better off 
than the farmers in the countryside. With improvements in adminis-
tration and efficient reinvestment ofresources, the Southern Nations 
and Orama Regions should be the most wealthy in the country due 
to the coffee and tea production there. 
Assessment of closure in the economic realm. Again, it is extremely 
difficult to make any conclusive statements on the structure of 
wealth in Ethiopia. The only statement that is supportable (and only 
on the basis of anecdotal evidence) is that because of their overrep-
resentation in the urban areas and because of the preferential access 
they have had to education over the past century, the elite of 
Ethiopia tend to be Amhara. 
Is there a mechanism at hand for changing the static snapshot pre-
sented above? There are no formal restrictions on access to wealth in 
Ethiopia. The only barrier to economic activity that is enshrined in 
the political structure (albeit informally) is the restriction on agricul-
tural investment in regions other than the home region of a particu-
lar ethnic group. 14 Additional problems may develop in the realm of 
land allocation and land reform. There is currently no market for 
land in Ethiopia, and regions are in the process of developing poli-
cies for land allocation and transfer. Should these policies tend to 
exclude minority groups in the regions, there would be tremendous 
potential for conflict. There are no identifiable restrictions on wealth 
access that may disadvantage individuals of a particular ethnic 
group. 
Closure in the Social Realm 
Status distinction in Ethiopia is a prominent issue, and both status 
and ethnicity have become more controversial since the 1991 regime 
14Sarah Gavian and Gemechu Degefe, "Commercial Investors and Access to Land," in 
Dessalegn Rahmato (ed.), Land Tenure and Land Policy in Ethiopia after the Derg, 
Trondheim, Norway: Working Papers on Ethiopian Development, No. 8, 1994. 
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change.15 Status at the national level only partly reflects political 
dominance. The EPRDF is predominantly Tigrayan, but the Amhara 
still retain the preeminent social position. A status stratification map 
for Ethiopia might work out as illustrated in Table 5.4. 
The Amhara and Tigray fill the top two places of the stratification 
map for three historical reasons: nobility, mobility, and Christianity. 
Both groups trace their ancestry back to the Abyssinian Empire of the 
12th century AD. 16 Their joint cultural myth extends back even 
further, dating the origin of these peoples to the meeting between 
King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (an Abyssinian). 
Mobility also explains the dominance of the Amhara and Tigray 
peoples. In the 19th and 20th centuries the two groups moved out of 
their traditional lands in the northern highlands of Ethiopia and took 
over a large portion of the fertile coffee lands in the south. This 
Table5.4 
Status Stratification 
Ethnic Group Status 
Amhara ++ 
Tigrayan ++ 
Aderi/Harari + 
Gurage + 
Oro mo 
Somali 
Afar 
+ + = high status; - - = low status 
(compiled on the basis of data 
presented earlier). 
15The reasons are primarily tied to the "nation-building" endeavor by the govern-
ment. John Markakis, "Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa," in 
Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Hom of 
Africa, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994, pp. 217-237. 
16For further information on Ethiopian political history, see Edmond J. Keller, Revo-
lutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic, Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1988; and Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994. 
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movement into the southern marches of the Ethiopian Empire 
resulted in the enserfment of the peoples who already lived on the 
land. Those enserfed were the Oromo, Gurage, Gedeo, and Wolaita 
people, among others. When the Amhara and Tigrayans moved into 
these areas they brought the apparatus of the state with them and 
enforced tax collection and the speaking of Amharic as the language 
of administration within the country. 
The third reason that both the Amhara and Tigray peoples are at the 
higher end of the stratification map is that both groups are predomi-
nantly Orthodox Christian. This gives them a higher status due to the 
ancient history of Orthodox Christianity in the region. The presence 
of the religion has meant that there has been a written record in 
Ethiopia since the 12th century, along with manuscripts on both 
religion and politics. This ancient record is combined with a modem 
sense of the importance of a "Christian" Ethiopia as a bulwark 
against Islamic influence. 
Until recently, the Amhara had unquestioned social dominance. 
There was a separation between the Tigrayans and the Amhara dur-
ing the early part of the 20th century as fighting developed between 
Ras Hailu, the Tigrayan aspirant to the throne, and Haile Selassie, an 
Amhara. As Haile Selassie's rule solidified, so did the iron grip of the 
Amhara over the political and economic institutions of the country. 
When the revolution came in 1974, Haile Selassie was succeeded by 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who, though of mixed parentage, identified 
himself with the Amhara. Mengistu ruled until 1991. 
The long stretch of Amhara leaders in Ethiopia has led to two inaccu-
rate and insidious ideas among the Amhara. The first is the associa-
tion of a particular Amhara "type" with the definition of Ethiopian: 
by this notion, an "Ethiopian" is a slight, light-skinned, Christian, 
Amharic-speaking farmer. The second is a sense of manifest destiny: 
an idea that the Amhara are somehow ordained to rule a "Greater 
Ethiopia." 17 These ideas are insidious because they give no quarter 
to the majority of the population who do not fit this "type" linguisti-
cally, religiously, or ethnically. 
17
"Greater Ethiopia" is a term used to include Eritrea, the state to the north of the 
current Ethiopian border (along the Red Sea Coast), that recently gained its indepen-
dence. 
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It used to be the case that Amharans saw the Tigrayans in a consan-
guineal fashion, but political differences made ethnic distinctions 
grow. Tigrayans spoke a different language, but it was understand-
able to Amharic speakers, and their cultures were virtually indistin-
guishable. The rift between the two groups was exacerbated in the 
mid-1980s, when the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 
became a thorn in the side of the Mengistu regime. As the TPLF 
began its advance on the capital city of Ethiopia and then took it over 
in 1991, the Tigrayans ceased to be cousins and became "foreigners" 
in the rhetoric of the radical Amhara. 
The Aderi, also known as the Harari, are aligned with the Tigrayans 
on the stratification map, just as they are in government. The Aderi 
are a population of approximately 26,000 who reside in and around 
the ancient Islamic city of Harar in southeastern Ethiopia. They have 
a high social status within the country because they are regarded as 
distinct, refined, and ancient in their origins. The Aderi are overrep-
resented in parliament and the Council of Ministers, as they are 
given one representative in each body for a group that is 0.0005 per-
cent of the Ethiopian population. Other groups, with larger popula-
tions, don't have any representatives in the Council of Ministers. 
This overrepresentation is due to the particular status of Harar, along 
with Addis Ababa, as a designated multiethnic city-state, indepen-
dent of any regional government. 
The Oromo and Gurage are both historically oppressed and predom-
inantly Islamic southern peoples.18 Amhara and Tigrayan north-
erners enserfed large numbers of Oromo peasants in southern 
Ethiopia until 1974. Even after 1974, the Oromo and Gurage were 
forced to learn Amharic in order to achieve any sort of educational or 
vocational success. The Gurage· are slightly higher on the social 
18There are an increasing number of studies on the history of the Oromo and Oro mo 
nationalism. Asafa Jalata, "Sociocultural Origins of the Oromo National Movement in 
Ethiopia," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 21, 1993, pp. 267-286; Asafa 
Jalata, Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868-1992, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993; P.T.W. Baxter, "The Creation and Constitution of 
Oromo Nationality," in Fukui and Markakis, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of 
Africa, pp. 167-186; Edmond J. Keller, "The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo and its 
Implications for Politics in Ethiopia," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 
December 1995, pp. 621-634; and Asafa Jalata, Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian 
Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997. 
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stratification map than the Oromo because they are associated with 
positive qualities based on their perceived business acumen. 
The Somali and Afar peoples bring up the lower segments of the 
stratification map because, in addition to being predominantly 
Islamic, they are pastoralists. Pastoralism is viewed in Ethiopia and 
throughout Africa as being less prestigious (even less human) than 
settled agricultural practices. 
What are the implications of this status distribution? At the national 
level, there are no tangible benefits or disadvantages to being of a 
particular ethnicity. In the regions there is a specific preference for 
those of the local ethnicity to fill positions in the regional adminis-
tration. Linguistic groups are not discriminated against in their 
regions, but non-Amharic speakers may find themselves disadvan-
taged if they interact with the bureaucracy of the national govern-
ment. Informally, a whole range of biases and perceptions sur-
rounds status hierarchy, with members of the less urbanized and 
non-Christian groups seen as less sophisticated or cultured. Such 
biases have a self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing component and 
affect myriad everyday decisions. 
The fact that there is very little movement between status groups 
attests to the lack of a mechanism for change within the Ethiopian 
social stratification system. Indeed, the norm for social tolerance is 
changing toward a greater degree of intolerance and ethnic solidar-
ity. Since the ratification of the new Ethiopian constitution, ethnic 
group and ethnic identity have become fundamentally important on 
a political and social level. Ethnicity defines regional appointments, 
political sympathies, and party affiliation. 
Overall Assessment of Closure 
Based on the information presented above, Table 5.5 summarizes the 
degree of closure (in an overall sense as well as in the political, eco-
nomic, and social realms) experienced by Ethiopia's main ethnic 
groups. To reiterate, closure in Weberian terms refers to the "process 
of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by 
closing off opportunities to another group." In the table, a group ex-
periencing a "low" degree of closure has the most opportunities open 
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Table5.5 
Patterns of Closure by Ethnicity in Ethiopia 
Political Economic Social Overall 
Am hara Low Low Low Low 
Tigrayan Low Low Low Low 
Aderi/Harari Low Moderate Low Low 
Gurage Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Oro mo Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Somali Moderate Moderate High Moderate/High 
Afar Moderate Moderate High Moderate/High 
to it. A group experiencing a "high" degree of closure has opportuni-
ties largely closed off. 
The Amhara and Tigrayans show a consistent pattern of privilege, 
and the Oromo and (especially) the Somali and Afar peoples are 
experiencing a moderate degree of closure in Ethiopian social and 
economic life. Politically, Tigrayans are dominant, but they do share 
power to a moderate degree with other ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, poverty is a great equalizing mechanism among the 
various ethnic groups. People in the countryside do not suffer high 
degrees of relative deprivation. In the urban areas, however, the 
Amhara and Tigrayans are present in greater numbers, and they are 
more educated and better employed than the Somali and Afar. Yet 
even if we take the differences between ethnic groups in the urban 
areas into account, the relative deprivation between groups is quite 
low. 
Issues of closure in Ethiopia are primarily historic in their origin, but 
they are changing, and we should expect to see changes in the eco-
nomic and social positions of the ethnic groups in this generation. 
Indeed, as the EPRDF political institutions take root, we should see 
some groups, particularly the Oromo, gain in political power. As they 
become politically powerful, we can expect their social position to 
improve. Thus, the stratification patterns have some flexibility. 
A final ranking of groups along the lines of privileged to dominated-
in relative terms-is given in Table 5.6. The specific placement of 
ethnic groups on the privileged-dominated scale is not evenly 
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Table5.6 
Ranking ofEthnic Groups in Ethiopia 
Privileged Amhara 
I Tigrayan 
I Aderi/Harari 
I Gurage 
I Oro mo 
.! Somali 
Dominated Afar 
spaced, and the overall differences between the top and bottom 
rankings are not extreme. 
TRANSFORMING POTENTIAL STRIFE INTO LIKELY STRIFE 
As a prospective case study, this section focuses on the process of 
potential mobilization of one of the main ethnic groups against the 
state. Three distinct potential processes of mobilization are sketched 
out, each based on one of the ethnic groups. The primary scenario 
focuses on the Amhara, and that mobilization process is sketched out 
in full. The secondary scenarios, focusing on the Orama and Somali, 
are discussed in a briefer format. 
PRIMARY SCENARIO: AMHARA MOBILIZATION 
The Amhara are among the most privileged ethnic groups in 
Ethiopia. However, there is a critical disjuncture between Amhara 
social and economic power and their current political weakness. 
Resentful of their fall from power, suspicious of the current regime, 
distrustful of any attempts at inclusion, and possessing a mythology 
of a "right to rule Ethiopia," the Amhara are in a position to be mobi-
lized for political action along ethnic lines. The abrupt change in 
power relations in Ethiopia left the Amhara embittered, hostile, and 
in search of a scapegoat.19 
19Scapegoats have been found alternatively in Eritrea and the United States. 
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Incipient Changes 
The ethnically inclusive declaratory policy of the current govern-
ment, as well as a strong Tigrayan role in the government, points to 
longer-term trends under which the Amhara cold see their relative 
share of power draining away. These trends put in place an ever-
present source of concern among the Amhara for their social and 
political position in the country. 
Sudden or at least less-expected changes, caused by centrifugal ten-
dencies in other regions of Ethiopia, also could spark greater Amhara 
mobilization. For example, there have been rumors of a referendum 
on independence for Oromia.20 Although such a referendum would 
be unlikely to succeed, given the composition of the regional 
assembly, public discussion of such a thing will almost certainly 
incite Amhara anger and provide fuel for mobilization. While many 
Orama see the 19th-century Amhara/Tigrayan expansion as colonial, 
Amhara tend to view "the conquered lands" as an inalienable part of 
Ethiopia and would resist their dispossession. 
Tipping Events 
Galvanizing or tipping events might involve the release of Amhara 
firebrands from prison or restrictions on Amhara media. The most 
famous of the major recent attempts to mobilize the Amhara are 
Professor Asrat Woldeyes's efforts to incite the rural Amhara to the 
same level of fervor as radical urban Amhara. His efforts in this re-
gard led to a jail sentence of five and a half years for attempting to 
incite ethnic violence. Professor Woldeyes, viewed by many as the 
spokesperson for the radical Amhara, faces additional charges asso-
ciated with a prison escape in 1994, which resulted in the death of 
several prison guards. Extended detention or lack of a trial for Wold-
eyes might prove a galvanizing factor in group mobilization. 
A second possible tipping event would be a restriction on the publi-
cation of opposition newspapers such as The Addis Tribune and 
other Amharic or Amhara-targeted papers. Amhara opposition 
groups are already extremely sensitive to government censorship, 
20
''TPLF talks with OLF," Ethiopian Review, May-June 1997, p. 12. 
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due to the fact that many of the journalists who have fallen afoul of 
the government are Amhara. 21 
Leadership 
Because the urban Amhara tend to be better educated than members 
of other ethnic groups, there are many present and potential leaders. 
Some Amhara activist leaders, such as Asrat Woldeyes and Taye 
Woldesemiat, are already in jail. Both men were university profes-
sors dismissed with 39 others in 1991 for their political activities. In 
addition to these 41 activists are other urban educated Amhara who 
have been working for the government or in the private sector and 
have the knowledge and awareness of organizational techniques to 
be more than able to lead an opposition group. Thus the leadership 
potential among the Amhara is deep, though the emergence of a 
specific individual as the leader is difficult to predict. 
Resources and Organization 
There seem to be ample resources available to the Amhara relative to 
other groups (that is, within the overall constraints of an extremely 
poor country). Radical Amhara groups within Ethiopia draw their 
support primarily from the population of Addis Ababa. The urban 
Amhara are among the wealthiest groups in Ethiopia, and they po-
tentially provide a large resource base. There are signs that Amhara 
activists are already using resources to obtain arms; the Ethiopian 
government has uncovered one Amhara attempt to cache arms. 
Political parties such as the All-Amhara People's Organization pro-
vide organizational structures for Amhara dissent and potential 
political violence. An antigovernment urban terrorist group active in 
Addis Ababa called the Ethiopian Patriotic Front offers an even more 
radical vehicle for violence, and it apparently has mastered the 
21The government has imprisoned 15 journalists in 1995-1996 for violation of the 
press law. Some have been imprisoned for inciting ethnic hatred, but others are in 
prison for violating accepted standards of decency. "Journalists Under Fire: 27 Dead, 
a Record 183 Jailed in '96," The Washington Post, March 15, 1997. 
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organizational skills required of a conspiratorial group.22 With some 
of the most educated elite of Ethiopia, the Amhara would have ample 
access to organizational skills, and would probably be the source of a 
relatively large share of the overall availability of such skills in 
Ethiopia. 
A chauvinistic Amhara movement has moderate to high organiza-
tional potential. Perhaps its greatest obstacle is that the numerically 
large Amhara population in the countryside is difficult to mobilize. 
In addition to the normal conservatism that might be expected from 
any peasant group, the Amhara peasants also experienced far more 
of the last civil war than their urban counterparts did and may still 
perceive the Tigrayan-dominated government as "Ethiopian" rather 
than ethnic antagonistics. 
Foreign Element 
The most significant foreign influence on ethnic relations in Ethiopia 
comes from Amhara abroad. The revenues collected overseas for the 
Amhara cause, particularly in the United States and the Scandina-
vian countries, are probably the most important source of support 
for the radical Amhara. In addition, Amhara groups in the United 
States give aid to the mobilization process in the form of intellectual 
justifications against the present status quo, disseminating them in 
Ethiopia through both hard-copy publications and the Internet. 
There is currently an effort to raise money in the United States for the 
Ethiopian Unity Front (EUF), an Amhara insurgency movement.23 It 
is unclear at the moment whether the EUF has started activity within 
Ethiopia, but the organization appears to have a ready cadre in the 
United States. 
A full-blown Amhara mobilization could count on little support from 
neighboring governments. Eritrea does not want to see the Amhara 
back in power, since it will then become a target of Amhara irreden-
22Security forces within the capital city have stopped the open activities of this group. 
The police continue to crack down on its remnants, one of whom, Assefa Marn, was 
killed while allegedly resisting arrest in May 1997. "ETA Executive Committee 
Member Shot," Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa), May9, 1997. 
23This group has been raising money in various U.S. cities. It is associated with the 
Amhara-dominated party CO EDF. 
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tist aspirations (an irony, given the denunciation of Tigrayans as for-
eigners by radical Amhara). Somalia is no longer a functioning state 
and does not seem likely to become one in the near term, ruling out 
its likelihood of being able to spend resources to support a major 
social movement in Ethiopia. Sudan is something of a wild card. Its 
Islamic government is unlikely to support any faction in Ethiopia 
except the Orama. Sudan currently finds Ethiopia a convenient 
scapegoat and blames it for the recent offensive of the Sudan Peo-
ple's Liberation Army-Sudan's own ethnic insurgency movement. 
Overall Assessment of Mobilization 
Strength of leadership will determine the intensity and effectiveness 
of Amhara mobilization. Small cell groups that try to spearhead a 
mobilization have formed already among the Amhara; at least some 
of these cells are prepared to use violence in the pursuit of their 
goals. With stronger leaders or, more specifically, leaders able to 
gain the support of the countryside, the potential for effective and 
widespread mobilization would escalate greatly. But the other ele-
ments of mobilization (resentment over perceived status usurpation, 
access to resources both at home and abroad, strong organizational 
potential) are in place, and the Amhara could command a powerful 
movement. 
SECONDARY SCENARIO: OROMO MOBILIZATION 
Numerically the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia by many estimates, 
the Orama have never been influential in Ethiopian government and 
they have a low status in contemporary Ethiopia. The Orama face a 
moderate level of closure and can point to some real grievances. The 
primary problem that sustains the continuing low status and influ-
ence of the Orama is their weak leadership. With a cohesive leader-
ship, the Orama probably would be the single most powerful ethnic 
group in Ethiopia. But so far, the leaders of the various Orama fac-
tions have been unable to agree on either goals or tactics. 
The Imperial Ethiopian government (before 1974) imposed brutal 
sanctions on the Orama as a group. The Orama obtained access to 
greater economic, if not political, benefits under the Derg govern-
ment (1974-1991). In the early 1990s, the Orama Liberation Front 
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(OLF) worked with the EPRDF to facilitate the overthrow of the Derg 
regime. It was there, however, that their trouble with the current 
government began, as two opposing factions developed within the 
Orama. The first faction wanted some type of cooperation and par-
ticipation with the EPRDF. The second favored secession from the 
Ethiopian state and the establishment of an independent "Oromia." 
The EPRDF's creation of the Orama People's Democratic Organiza-
tion (OPDO) under the EPRDF umbrella exacerbated the rift within 
the Orama. This group, in collaboration with the EPRDF, drew 
power away from the OLF. The OPDO, representing an Orama 
minority, participated in the elections of 1992 and 1995 and won all 
of the Orama seats because the OLF declined to participate. The 
OLF remains organized in the countryside and retains control of 
weapons and men. There have been reports in 1996-1997 of OLF-
initiated hostilities in the Orama region. In other words, there is a 
dedicated cadre-willing to use violence-in place, and it could 
spearhead the mobilization process. If the rumored referendum on 
the independence of Oromia were to occur, a more powerful and 
united Orama movement would emerge no matter what the out-
come of the vote might be. 
The splintering and weakening of the Orama as an ethnic group 
organized for political ends could all be changed with the appear-
ance of a young and charismatic leader. Youth is a necessity because 
of the leadership conflicts and struggles for power that have divided 
the older Orama leadership. An Orama mobilization might be aimed 
at either a substantial share of political power within Ethiopia or an 
outright independent Oromia. 
In an overall sense, the mobilization potential of the Orama would 
face resource problems. However, in the extremely poor conditions 
of contemporary Ethiopia, the pure force of numbers could offset 
some of the resource problems. 
TERTIARY SCENARIO: SOMALI MOBILIZATION 
The Somali population (part of the Ogadeni clan) is numerically 
small but inhabits a compact area. The Somali face a moderate level 
of closure and have real grievances against the government. A 
Somali mobilization would have limited resource potential, espe-
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cially vis-a-vis the relative resource levels available to the Ethiopian 
state. But if there were sudden changes in the balance of power in 
Ethiopia (arising, for example, from one of the two scenarios 
described above), the mobilization might be successful. Foreign 
assistance-from Somalia-is a crucial variable that could augment 
substantially the resource base of the Somali in Ethiopia. 
Since the British relinquished the territory in 1955, the Ogaden has 
been the focus of several military conflicts between Ethiopia and 
Somalia (1960, 1964, 1973, 1977, and 1996).24 Since 1991, the 
Ethiopian government has engaged the armed Ethiopian Somali 
group Al-Ithad Al-Islam in the Ogaden and across the border in 
Somalia. The 1992 elections in the area had to be postponed because 
of regional insecurity. The goal of the Al-Ithad Al-Islam-a group 
that could lead the mobilization process-is openly secessionist, as 
the group has tried to detach the Ogaden, now called the Somali 
region, from the Ethiopian state. The Al-Ithad group has been impli-
cated by the government of Ethiopia in several bombings in 1996-
1997 in the capital city of Addis Ababa. 25 
Currently, the Ethiopian government maintains control of the 
Ogaden through administrative and police means, keeping any mass 
mobilization at bay. But if the Somali state were to again become 
viable, the situation might change. Moreover, if the Somali state 
were to resurface with a ruler from the Ogadeni clan, the stability of 
the Ethiopian Somali region certainly would be at risk. The area also 
may have potential for oil production. It was, in fact, rumors of oil 
discoveries in the Ogaden that led to the 1973 conflict between 
Ethiopia and Somalia. Further discoveries or rumors of discoveries 
may exacerbate the conflict that already exists. 
In an overall sense, the mobilization potential of the Somali is con-
strained by resource problems. But the situation could change in the 
relative sense-in case of ethnic mobilization within Ethiopia by 
another, major group-and in the absolute sense, by way of assis-
24For more background information, see Patrick Gilkes, Conflict in Somalia and 
Ethiopia, NewYork: NewDiscovery, 1994. 
25But it should be noted that in the investigation of at least one of the bombings, the 
Al-lthad Al-Islam might have been used as a convenient scapegoat by the police. 
"Explosions in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa," Ethiopian Review, May-June 1997, p. 12. 
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tance from Somalia. The clan-based structure of the Somali provides 
effective channels of organization through which to funnel and use 
the resources. The clan structure also provides a means of legit-
imization for a potential Somali leader (assuming skillful leadership 
that could unify the various factions within the clans). Moreover, a 
moderate to high degree of closure provides readily identifiable 
grievances around which to mobilize the group. The potential of a 
windfall from natural resource exploration could fuel further the 
mobilization. 
ASSESSING THE STATE 
Accommodative Capability 
How inclusive and responsive are Ethiopian political structures to 
the general population? The political institutions in Ethiopia are 
ostensibly democratic and inclusive, though in practice they have 
failed to fulfill their functions, as few opposition groups so far have 
chosen to participate formally in the electoral process. The view of 
the governing structure as essentially a sophisticated fig leaf for 
Tigrayan control has discouraged widespread participation. The goal 
of the opposition parties that do not agree with EPRDF policies is to 
"deny legitimacy" to the government.26 The clearest example of 
group exclusion concerns the Oromo Liberation Front. The OLF has 
opted out of the formal political process since 1991 and the forma-
tion of the transitional government of Ethiopia. This is troublesome 
because the Oromo are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia. 
But if they want to participate in government, non-Tigrayan groups 
are required to accept a strong Tigrayan role in defining Ethiopia and 
its political agenda. Many organfaations may not relish cooperation 
of this sort, since their constituents may interpret it as collaboration, 
with all the attendant negative repercussions. 
Is there potential for change in Ethiopian political structures? Mech-
anisms for conflict resolution and institutional change are built into 
the Ethiopian constitution. According to it, questions of federal and 
regional laws that contradict the constitution are sent to the upper 
chamber of the parliament (the Federal Council) for resolution. Pro-
26Lyons, "Closing the Transition," (1996). 
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posed amendments to the constitution follow a more complicated 
process through the regional councils and then both national houses 
of parliament.27 The constitution includes a process by which ethnic 
groups may secede from the Ethiopian state.28 Because the 
constitution has been in force only since mid-1995, its provisions for 
conflict resolution remain to be tested. In other words, they exist in 
theory but have not yet been practiced. 
In short, it is too early to assess whether the channels for institutional 
change are effective. Nominally, the political system is inclusive, and 
its decentralization aims at a high level of participation (from at least 
the major ethnic groups). But the inclusiveness for now is embedded 
in the larger context of Ethiopian recent history, that is, within the 
constraints of a completely new system of governing set up by an 
ethnically defined group that won a lengthy civil war. As such, the 
system has not managed to convert the skeptics, as most of the non-
Tigrayan population appears to view it with a measure of distrust, a 
Tigrayan creation. As the system develops and matures, the opposi-
tion parties may decide to "legitimize" the political process with their 
participation. The election in the year 2000 will be key in determin-
ing the relative inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the regime. 
In terms of prevailing norms of governance, neither the autocratic 
imperial Ethiopian government (pre-1974) nor the Derg (1974-1991) 
were tolerant of opposition. The Derg used widespread violence and 
repression to deal with any kind of dissent, real or imagined. In 
comparison with such a past, the post-1991 norms of governance 
have been remarkably tolerant and inclusive, even though there has 
been some retrenchment since 1994.29 Initially, the EPRDF made a 
27The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic ofEthiopia, 1995. 
28Some have argued that the constitution reflects the very nature of the Tigray rise to 
power and its attempt to redefine the state as one comprising many distinct cultures; 
thus, the right to secede is a fundamental aspect of the TPLF view ofEthiopia. Assefaw 
Bariagaber, "The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of 
Ethnicity and Constitutional Experiments," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6, 
November 1998, pp. 1056--1073. 
29Since 1994 and the end of the transitional charter, the government's behavior 
toward groups that opposed or declined to participate in the political process has 
shown a trend toward less tolerance, with incidents of intimidation and force used 
against domestic opponents. The incidents include the arrest and imprisonment of 
journalists, a public war of words with opposition groups, and crackdowns on demon-
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distinct attempt to include other groups, such as the OLF, in the gov-
erning coalition. It also allowed a free press to flourish and sought 
the political opinions of the populace (i.e., the constitutional 
"discussions" that occurred at the neighborhood level). Thus, the 
governing structure set up by the EPRDF has tried for inclusiveness 
in a way that showed a real break with the previous patterns of gov-
ernance, even if the limited participation by non-Tigrayan groups in 
the governing process so far suggests their persistent distrust. In 
addition, the ethnically based federal structure shows the vitality of 
ethnically defined collectivist norms. Finally, for many Ethiopians, 
including members of the Orama and many smaller groups, an 
Ethiopian identity is weak and secondary to their ethnic attach-
ments.30 
What is the level of cohesion among the ruling elites? Little informa-
tion is available about the inner workings of the EPRDF government, 
but there are some signs of discord. The discord may center on pol-
icy differences rather than fundamental issues on the setup of the 
state. The very public firing in 1996 of the deputy prime minister and 
minister of defense, Tamirat Layne, may be an indication of a power 
struggle. Whether this was the elimination of one individual or an 
indication of deeper splits and factional power struggles within the 
ruling coalition is uncertain. Adding to suspicions of conflict within 
the party was a purging of OPDO party members in April 1997. 
Eighty OPDO members were subsequently placed in custody. This 
development suggests that cohesion among the EPRDF coalition 
partners is declining and that the EPRDF is willing to take action 
against partners who are not toeing the party line. The trend appears 
to be toward a more isolated Tigrayan-based governing coalition. 
Whether the trend means an increase or decrease in leadership co-
hesion is impossible to say at this time. 
In conclusion, the accommodative capability of the Ethiopian state is 
difficult to assess in an unequivocal manner because of the ambigui-
ties surrounding it. The institutional structure of the state seems 
strations. In part at least, the more forceful government reaction is a response to the 
non-participation of other groups in the process. S. F. Joireman, "Opposition Politics 
in Ethiopia," September 1997; "Students Say No to Petition and Remain in Detention," 
Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa). April 4, 1997. 
30see the Afterword to this chapter for potential changes to this situation. 
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viable for an inclusive and responsive system, but the legacy of a long 
period of interethnic tensions and distrust remains a practical obsta-
cle to achieving the democratic potential of the institutional struc-
ture contained in the constitution. A move by the coalition toward 
less inclusiveness of other groups may, in fact, have the effect of 
strengthening the internal cohesion of the ruling group. 
Fiscal and Economic Capability 
The fiscal health of Ethiopia shows serious strains, and the mainstay 
of the economy-agriculture-is subject to weather- and climate-
induced disruptions. However, the macroeconomic indicators have 
stabilized and the economy has registered consistent growth since 
the end of the civil war (1.7 percent in 1993-1994 and 4.9 percent in 
1994-1995). The state's economic targets through 1999 include 6 
percent real GDP growth, limiting the external current account 
deficit to 9.2 percent of GDP, and maintaining low inflation. 
Although the goals are ambitious, they are realistic, assuming no 
major drought and/ or worldwide recession. 
The state has followed a consistent pattern of deficit spending. In 
the fiscal year 1994-1995, the Ethiopian budgetary deficit reached 3.8 
percent of GDP. Ethiopia also has a heavy debt; the World Bank rates 
Ethiopia as severely indebted and "possibly stressed" regarding the 
sustainability of its debt burden.31 In 1995, approximately 13.6 
percent of Ethiopia's earnings from exports went to the payment of 
the interest and principal on debts.32 Ethiopian gold reserves have 
remained steady, and its foreign exchange position has improved 
significantly since 1992. The state also has further loans it could call 
on from international lending institutions. See Table 5.7. 
Widening the tax base and improving tax collection remain central 
objectives of the government. Customs duties and sales taxes remain 
important for revenue generation. Taxes on personal and business 
income and profits have risen substantially. Both trends imply an 
improved tax-collection system. There is some potential for the 
31World Bank, Global Development Finance, Volume 1, Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 1997, p. 43. 
32Ibid., p. 216. 
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reappropriation of funds within the state budget. Although health 
and education have registered substantial growth since 1992 and 
strict defense expenditures have gone down to 13 percent of the 
current expenditures in the 1994-1995 fiscal year, there seems to be 
enough leeway for further shifting of funds on a short-term basis. 
See Table 5.8. 
The wealth of the core constituency of the ruling elite does not differ 
at all from the wealth of the general population. Neither this group 
nor any other in Ethiopian society faces a disproportionate tax bur-
den. Some accusations have surfaced that a disproportionate 
amount of development aid is directed toward the Tigray region, but 
since Tigray received little development assistance from the govern-
ment between 1984 and 1991, even if this were to be the case it would 
Table 5.7 
Ethiopian National Bank Reserves (in US$ million) 
1993 1994 1995 
Gold (national valuation) ll.4 11.4 11.4 
IMF special drawing rights 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Reserve position in IMF 9.6 10.2 10.5 
Foreign exchange 445.9 533.6 760.8 
Total 467.2 555.6 782.9 
SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
Table5.8 
Ethiopian Government Expenditures (in millions ofbirr) 
1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 
Total 
Capital expenditure 
Current expenditure 
State administration, defense, and police 
Education and health 
Interest and charges 
SOURCE: National Bank ofEthiopia 
6,054 
2,150 
3,904 
1,173 
583 
530 
7,492 
3,018 
4,474 
1,453 
742 
952 
8,152 
3,077 
5,075 
1,561 
936 
855 
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hardly change the wealth of Tigrayans vis-a-vis other Ethiopian eth-
nic groups. 
In sum, in an absolute sense, the fiscal capacity of the Ethiopian state 
is weak. But within the constraints of being one of the poorest 
countries in the world, Ethiopia's state policies of economic liberal-
ization have borne some fruit. Although the fiscal and economic 
resources and capabilities available to the government remain low, 
the situation is improving. 
Coercive Capability 
Cabinet ministers, subordinate to the prime minister, control the 
police and the armed forces. The police are under the control of the 
Justice Ministry. The minister of defense (Teferra Walwa) is consti-
tutionally required to be a civilian.33 In addition, Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi has his own security team headed by TPLF Central 
Committee member Mulugeta Alemseged. Rather than an instru-
ment of control over portions of the population, the team is oriented 
more toward the protection of the top leadership. Formally, there is 
constitutional provision for a state of emergency; at such a time, 
there is a restriction on "fundamental political and democratic 
rights." The Council of Ministers can declare a state of emergency 
when there is danger to the "constitutional order" that cannot be 
brought under control by means of normal law enforcement. The 
Chamber of People's Representatives must approve any declaration 
of a state of emergency, though under the conditions of near-com-
plete EPRDF control of the legislature, this provision is not a major 
obstacle. In practice, despite the formal rules restricting the use of 
force, extrajudicial killings and disregard for civil rights and due pro-
cess within the country have grown in number. 
Who serves in the apparati of violence? Although the government 
has attempted to form a "multiethnic defense force" consisting of all 
of Ethiopia's ethnic groups, the armed forces continue to be based 
on the armed wing of the EPRDF (and especially the TPLF) that won 
the civil war. A substantial number of personnel from the OLF were 
also absorbed initially into the single post-civil war Ethiopian mili-
33 Article 95, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
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tary, though their continued presence is in doubt in view ofthe OLF's 
withdrawal of its support of the government in 1992. 
Official statements claim that the military is now far more represen-
tative than it was in 1991, when it was predominantly Tigrayan with 
some Amhara participation.34 In line with the striving for greater 
inclusiveness, new recruits of all ethnic backgrounds go on to officer 
training if they are assessed as having promise. According to a recent 
USIS report, in 1995-1996, 25,000 primarily Tigrayan soldiers were 
demobilized and replaced by recruits from other ethnic groups.35 
However, several thousand of the demobilized Tigrayan soldiers 
have become policemen.36 One can raise questions about how loyal 
Tigrayan police officers assigned to regions other than Tigray will be 
to the regional police hierarchy. 
What norms exist with respect to the use of violence domestically? 
Every government in Ethiopian history has used the armed forces to 
crack down on domestic uprisings.37 Indeed, there is no precedent 
within the country for government restraint in its actions against citi-
zens. The EPRDF government, since 1991, has been less violent 
toward its citizens than any other in recent history, but accusations 
of extrajudicial killings and beatings in the south and torture within 
the prisons have surfaced.38 More recently, in May 1997, an alleged 
leader of the Ethiopian United Patriotic Front was killed in Addis 
Ababa under suspicious circumstances (with government spokes-
men claiming he was "resisting arrest").39 
Ethiopian culture, insofar as can be generalized among all its ethnic 
groups, has a relatively low threshold for violence. Violence is often 
used as a means of political expression, and there is only limited 
34
"Effort to Build Multi-National Defense Force Successful," Ethiopian News Agency 
(Addis Ababa), July23, 1996. 
35usrs, 0996). 
36
"Looking Federal," Africa Confidential, September 22, 1995, p. 5. 
37See Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991; Africa Watch, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New 
York: Human Rights Watch, 1991. 
38Lyons, "Closing the Transition," 1996. 
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experience with ideas of human rights as enshrined by the United 
Nations. 
Are the armed forces suitable for domestic use? The armed forces are 
largely light infantry, suitable for domestic use, especially in an envi-
ronment of permissive norms toward violence. Most soldiers have 
extensive experience fighting in the Ethiopian countryside, gained 
during the civil war. The military could be employed in a range of 
activities, from forceful crowd control to counterinsurgency. Train-
ing for domestic use is likely to be rudimentary. 
In conclusion, the state can readily resort to violence, and the appa-
rati of violence have considerable capabilities against domestic op-
ponents. Use of force in the domestic context is constitutionally 
allowable through the imposition of a state of emergency. 
STRATEGIC BARGAINING 
This analysis of the potential mobilization of the Amhara, and to a 
lesser degree that of the Oro mo and Somali groups, on the one hand, 
and the capabilities of the Ethiopian state to deal with any such 
mobilization, on the other, provides a means for considering the 
possible interactions between them based on the categories and 
matrices of the framework presented in Chapter Two. As in the two 
previous cases, the group and state types are categorized on the basis 
of their capacities, and the matrices provide a way to think about 
their interaction conceptually. 
Measuring the Group's Capacities 
The leadership of the Amhara is confident. This confidence stems 
from the mythology of the group, including perceptions of manifest 
destiny, the view of the current government as unrightfully in place, 
and the strong rhetoric supporting these views emanating from the 
Amhara diaspora in diverse areas of the world. The leadership has 
not hesitated to take risks. The radical Amhara activists are united in 
their intent to overthrow the current government, though what type 
of regime they think should take its place, a predominantly Amhara 
state or a multiethnic state, is not yet clear. Thus, the assessment of 
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leadership that a potential mobilized Amhara is likely to have is 
"strong." 
With respect to resources, support for the Amhara is good, especially 
in the relative sense of the poor conditions in Ethiopia. The Amhara 
activists have an extensive support network overseas, and they draw 
their support within the country from the wealthiest and most edu-
cated people. At present the resource base is sufficient to support an 
urban-based movement against the government. The available sup-
port is well-suited to the goal of ousting the current regime from 
power. But it may not be enough if the objective is to establish a 
predominantly Amhara rather than multiethnic state. Thus, the 
assessment of resource support that a potential mobilized Amhara is 
likely to have is "good." 
Regarding popular support for the Amhara mobilization, the activist 
Amhara cohort so far is primarily urban. The more numerous 
Amhara in the countryside have not been mobilized. Land reform 
may yet change the situation, but there is little evidence of it at the 
present. In addition, there are no readily identifiable other groups 
that seem willing or likely to support the Amhara. The Tigrayans are 
currently in control of the government and are, therefore, the enemy. 
The Oromo are extremely unlikely to form any sort of alliance with 
the Amhara, for many Oromo consider them former "oppressors." 
Thus, the assessment of popular support that a potential mobilized 
Amhara is likely to have is "weak." 
Based on these assessments, the mobilized Amhara is judged to be a 
type D group. The capacities of such a group are as follows: 
Accommodative: low; 
Sustainment: high; 
Cohesiveness: high. 
Measuring the State's Capacities 
Concerning the leadership of the state, the EPRDF government built 
a guerrilla army and created a development arm and a well-con-
structed ideology before it won a civil war in 1991. After emerging as 
the victors in the war, the EPRDF then tried to build a multiethnic 
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ruling coalition for Ethiopia, with EPRDF at the core. It also wrote a 
new constitution and embarked on development projects within the 
country. There is no question that the leaders ofEPRDF are secure in 
their position and beliefs. They have attempted to make the system 
of governance inclusive to all Ethiopians but have not hesitated to 
use forceful means in implementing their policies. They have a clear 
vision of a more developed and prosperous Ethiopia, based on 
consociational ethnic relations and a market economy. Thus, the 
assessment ofleadership is "strong." 
In terms of its fiscal position, the state has engaged in deficit spend-
ing and has become deeply indebted. There is some room for reallo-
cation of funds, within the overall constraints of a low state budget. 
If the economy continues to expand, there are more optimistic 
prospects for the future. But the agricultural base of the economy 
and a dependence on the export of primary products as the source of 
most foreign exchange puts in place a low ceiling for growth and rev-
enue generation. Thus, the assessment of fiscal position is "weak." 
Regarding the regime type of the state, this capacity is not as clear-
cut as the others. The Ethiopian regime exhibits the characteristics 
of both types. Institutions exist for competitive elections and the 
replacement of government officials; however, these institutions 
have not been put to the test sufficiently to conclude without hesita-
tion that the regime is inclusive. A largely free media exists, though 
some harassment and intimidation of the press is evident. There are 
limits on executive power, but there are also prevailing norms of 
intolerance. The tendencies will be easier to ascertain in another few 
years, especially after the elections in 2000. Yet it is clear that the 
current regime is much more inclusive than the previous regimes in 
recent Ethiopian history. Thus, on a close call, the regime is assessed 
as "inclusive." 
Based on these assessments, the Ethiopian state is judged to be a 
type C state. The capacities of such a state are as follows: 
Accommodative: high; 
Sustainment: low; 
Coercive: low. 
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Note that ifthe regime type is assessed as exclusive, then the coercive 
capacity is high, and the state type is G. 
Outcome of Bargaining and Preferences for Violence 
Based on the matrix showing the preferences of the mobilized group, 
a type D group has the following preferences toward a type C state: 
(1) negotiate, (2) exploit, and (3) intimidate. Based on the matrix 
showing the preferences of the state toward a mobilized group, a 
type C state has the following preferences toward a type D group: (1) 
repress, (2) exploit, and (3) negotiate. Note that if the state type is G, 
due to an assessment of the regime as exclusive, the group's prefer-
ences change to exploit, negotiate, intimidate. The state's prefer-
ences remain the same: repress, exploit, negotiate. 
Comparing group and state preferences leads to the conclusion that 
the potential for violence in the dyadic encounter between a primar-
ily urban-based mobilized Amhara and an EPRDF (Tigrayan) 
Ethiopian state is high. The violence-prone outcome stems primarily 
from the state's preference for a strategy of repressing the challenger, 
with a hedging strategy of exploiting the weakness within the mobi-
lized group. In practical terms, the latter may mean a forceful crack-
down and intimidation of the urban Amhara and incentives to the 
rural Amhara to continue their acquiescence. Quite simply, the 
EPRDF has few resources with which to head off dissent, but it has a 
disciplined and cohesive leadership, a blueprint for the future, and 
control of substantial apparatus of violence, all of which make it 
determined to stay in power, by force if necessary. The preferred 
Amhara strategy is to negotiate, with a hedging strategy of exploita-
tion or, failing that, perhaps even outright intimidation of the state. 
But the pattern of preferences in strategies clearly illustrates the 
weakness and power difference between the group and the state. 
If the state is assessed as an exclusive regime type, then the group's 
first two preferences are reversed. A more forceful strategy of 
exploitation is the preferred strategy, for the state makes the situa-
tion of the Amhara worse and the group then needs to demonstrate 
its resolve. 
The choices in the original matchup are interesting because they are 
the inverse of each other. The state starts from a position of strength 
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and has incentives to keep its superior position. On the other hand, 
the Amhara start from a position of weakness and are wary of an 
escalation to violence because that will put the group at risk. The 
group has incentives to continue to negotiate (forcefully, through the 
exploit option, if need be) but not to resort to all-out force. 
If the Amhara leadership were able to mobilize the rural Amhara, 
turning the group type to A, its choices against a still predominantly 
inclusive regime type (state type C) would stay the same. Moreover, 
the group would stand a real chance of having a larger access to 
power, because the state's preference would shift to negotiation as 
the preferred strategy. But if an Amhara shift to type A is accompa-
nied by a state move toward a more exclusive regime type (state type 
G), then violence becomes the preferred strategy for both sides. 
Intelligence analysis needs to be on the alert for such an evolution in 
Ethiopia. 
What is telling about the choice of strategies is that the state has little 
tolerance for any challenges from the Amhara, and the state's re-
source base supports a strategy that includes a quick recourse to 
force. The Amhara are weaker and, from a resource base perspective, 
their demands and tactics are likely to be moderate. 
The Oromo. With respect to the secondary scenarios of mobiliza-
tion, the current situation of the Oromo is characterized by weak 
leadership, weak resource support (predominantly poor and rural), 
and broad popular support (largest single ethnic group, with appeal 
potential beyond the Orama), which make it group type E. The 
group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are 
exploit, negotiate, intimidate. The state's preferences against the 
group are exploit, negotiate, repress. If the state type is assessed as 
G, then the group's preferences are negotiate, exploit, surrender, and 
the state's preferences become exploit, negotiate, repress. In neither 
of the four sets of preferences is violent outcome either a first or 
second preferred strategy. According to the framework, there is little 
potential for Orama-centered violence. 
If the Orama move toward a strong leadership (group type C), then 
the group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are 
negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's preferences are negotiate, 
exploit, repress. In other words, even if the Orama mobilize with a 
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strong leadership, there is still little potential for violence if the state 
stays inclusive or moves further toward inclusion of other groups. 
However, the Oromo with a strong leadership (group type C) facing a 
state type G (exclusive regime) have very different preferences: 
intimidate, exploit, negotiate. The state's preferences then become 
repress, exploit, negotiate. In other words, the primary strategic 
preferences for both the state and the group are for the use of 
violence. 
The Somali. The current situation of the Somali is characterized by 
strong leadership, weak resource support, and weak popular support 
(small overall numbers, limited appeal to other groups), which make 
it group type G. The group's preferences against state type C 
(inclusive regime) are negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's 
preferences against the group are repress, exploit, negotiate. If the 
state is assessed as G, then the group's preferences are exploit, intim-
idate, negotiate. The state's preferences remain repress, exploit, 
negotiate. In short, the state has a preferred strategy of violence 
toward the group. The group's preference for violence increases as 
the state turns toward greater exclusiveness. According to the 
framework, there is good potential for violence to accompany any 
Somali mobilization. 
If the Somali move toward greater resource support (group type D), 
perhaps as a result of assistance from a reconstituted Somalia, then 
the group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are 
negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's preferences are repress, 
exploit, negotiate. Against a state defined as an exclusive regime 
(state type G), the group's preferences are exploit, negotiate, intimi-
date. The state's preferences reniain repress, exploit, negotiate. In 
other words, the state has a preferred strategy to turn to violence to 
counter a Somali mobilization in conditions of both limited or strong 
resource support from Somalia. Given the shape of the state's re-
sponses to Somali activism so far, the assessment is on the mark. 
Revisiting the Evaluation 
There is much to be said for the portrayal of the type of ethnic ten-
sions between the Amhara and the Tigrayan-dominated state as 
expressed in the terms above. The Amhara have followed the identi-
fied strategic preference for negotiation. The preference does not 
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mean that some activists within the group are not preparing for more 
forceful action, and factions of the Amhara, both in Ethiopia and 
abroad, advocate strong measures. 40 But so far, the Amhara have 
"negotiated" through implied threats and a more pronounced mobi-
lization effort. The Amhara have launched neither an insurgency nor 
even a terrorist campaign; they have stayed largely within the bounds 
of peaceful, if sometimes attention-getting, methods. 
The state has shown little tolerance for any challenger. It has acted 
to repress vocal dissenters, and its potential for violent measures 
seems to be understood by all the major actors in Ethiopia. Whether 
the state moves toward being more or less inclusive during the next 
few years is crucial. If it moves toward greater inclusivity, then the 
strategic preferences of any challenging groups will also change, 
usually toward more peaceful methods of taking on the state. 
The Oromo and Somali relationship with the state also falls within 
the bounds of the conceptual framework of the model. The main 
Oromo groups disagree on the extent of participation in the govern-
ment, with the differences primarily based on greater sense of sepa-
ration or inclusion of the Oromo in Ethiopia. Negotiation strategies 
predominate, as borne out in reality. Similarly, the Somali relation-
ship is captured in the preference of the state for repression no 
matter which of the two main paths the Somali mobilization takes. 
The heavy-handed state control over the Somali (emphasizing the 
role of the police), indicates the accuracy of the framework. 
For the purposes of tracking the evolution of interethnic relations in 
Ethiopia, any appearance of the following trends needs special moni-
toring by intelligence analysts: 
• A clear move by the EPRDF away from the attempt at inclusion of 
other ethnic groups in the governance of the country and toward 
a more narrow emphasis on the Tigray. Specific indicators might 
include a dwindling influence of non-Tigrayan parties (the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement [ANDM] and the 
Oromo People's Democratic Organization [OPDO]) within the 
EPRDF, greater prominence of Tigray mythology in EPRDF's 
40Taye Walde Semiat and the Ethiopian Patriotic Front, now also the Ethiopian United 
Front. 
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statements, or even the creation of a Tigray-centric vision of 
Ethiopia as a guiding plan for the future evolution of the country. 
In terms of the model, this would represent a move toward state 
type G, one of the most violence-prone state types. 
• A significantly higher level of openness to and acceptance of 
urban Amhara appeals by the rural Amhara. Specific indicators 
might include the loss of support for the ANDM in the rural 
Amhara areas, a changed pattern of activity of the Amhara mili-
tant groups, and changes in philosophy and pronouncements of 
the urban Amhara activists to include concerns central to the 
rural Amhara. In terms of the model, this would represent a 
move toward group type A, one of the least violence-prone group 
types. 
• The evolution of ties among the Oromo organizations toward 
greater cooperation or even unity. The mobilizing message 
among the united and mobilized Oromo would be important: Is 
it secessionist, or does it emphasize inclusion in the current 
Ethiopian structures? In terms of the model, the crucial variable 
is the type of state such an Oro mo group would face. If it were an 
exclusive regime type, then the matchup would be highly 
violence-prone. 
• Concerning the role of Somalia in the Ogaden, the state's heavy-
handed attitude toward the Somali is unlikely to change, but in 
case of a revitalized Somalia emerging in the future, the intra-
Ethiopian Somali-centered tension may attain again the inter-
state conflict dimension that it has had several times in the past. 
• The use of Islamic rhetoric and Islamic appeals, especially by the 
Oromo and the Somalis. If, in response, the EPRDF turns toward 
greater exclusion of these major non-Tigray groups, then, in 
terms of the model, the likelihood of violence will be enhanced. 
• The ongoing process of regionalization and, specifically, the 
treatment of minority groups within each ethnic state. For 
example, perceived mistreatment of the Amhara minority in the 
Oromo state (in terms of land allocation or equal administration 
of justice) would escalate the grievances of and potential for the 
mobilization of the Amhara. 
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Thinking about the dynamics of ethnic relations and potential for 
strife in Ethiopia, the framework presented above makes apparent 
the following intelligence needs and information gaps: 
• Tracking the rise of militant activists among the urban Amhara 
and any evidence that points to their increased preparations for 
armed actions against the government. 
• Tracking the appeal of the urban Amhara mobilizational appeals 
among the rural Amhara, including the interest by urban Amhara 
activists in the rural Amhara, visits, common organizations, and 
organizational channels to further the mobilization process. 
• Following closely the appeal of EPRDF to non-Tigrayan groups, 
including signs of willingness by the Amhara, Oromo, and Somali 
to participate in the governance of the country and the popular-
ity of major non-Tigrayan EPRDF political figures among their 
ethnic cohorts. 
• Following closely the appeal of anti-EPRDF, ethnically based 
political groupings in the Amhara, Oromo, and Somali regions. 
• Analytical scrutiny of the 1994 census data, including taking into 
account the probable errors of under- and overcounting, the 
identification of minority groups within regions (for example, 
Amhara living in Oromo areas), their projected rates of growth, 
and potential for increased ethnic competition at substate 
(regional) levels. 
• Additional information on the police, including the principles 
used (in theory and in practice) for selection and promotion 
within the police force, the ethnic composition of the regional 
police forces, and the relationship between the police and the 
armed forces at the local level. 
• Additional information on the armed forces, including the 
changing ethnic composition of the officer corps and the actual 
criteria for promotion, the principles behind stationing and 
assignment of troops in the regions, as well as indications of the 
overall prestige of the armed forces among the various ethnic 
groups. 
The Ethiopian Prospective Case 231 
Close attention to these issues may enable an early identification and 
warning of impending ethnic strife in Ethiopia. 
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
The framework presented here examines the situation in Ethiopia 
through a series of dyads, pitting a specific mobilized ethnic group 
against the Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian state. As such, the model 
does not capture the various intergroup relations that may be influ-
ential in the equation. For example, Amhara mobilization may spur 
greater Oromo support for the Tigrayan-led government, or, depend-
ing on the course the mobilization takes, it could spur the Oromo to 
undertake their own mobilization against the Tigray. In other words, 
a weakened Tigray-led Ethiopian state may come under challenges 
from both the Amhara and the Oromo, with the Amhara-Oromo 
relations ranging anywhere from tacit alliance to mutual hostility 
(surpassing even their hostility toward the Tigray-led government). 
On the other hand, the ethnic mobilization of the Amhara against the 
Ethiopian state is interesting in the sense that it stipulates the mobi-
lization of an ethnic group to restore the privileges the group once 
had. The two secondary scenarios, focusing on the Oromo and the 
Somali, add further depth to the analysis. 
Critics may believe that the lack of a multiactor perspective to the 
model is a serious flaw that detracts from its usefulness. The lack 
may be a necessary shortcoming to make the model user-friendly, 
but it need not be a fatal flaw. The framework provides a tool for 
thinking abstractly about the mobilization patterns and challenges to 
the ruling state authorities. It is meant to provide insight into the 
strategic preferences available to the main actors under certain 
"what-if' conditions. As such, the model aims to be parsimonious, 
and its narrowing of the crucial questions to the main dyad illumi-
nates the logically derived preferences of both actors without 
unwieldy mathematical equations. The way to capture the influence 
of other parties on the crucial dyad is to include their impact when 
calculating the state's and the group's capabilities. For example, in 
accounting for the Oromo factor in the Tigray-led state against 
Amhara dyad, the limited appeal to the Oromo of the Amhara mobi-
lization can be captured in the assessment of the sustainment and 
cohesiveness capacity of the Amhara. Similarly, a potential Oromo 
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disinclination to defend the Tigrayan-led state against a challenging 
Amhara can be captured in the assessment of all three state capaci-
ties. 
Since the model was applied to a prospective case, its accuracy in 
anticipating the likely strategies that the challenging groups and the 
state are likely to follow is, as yet, unverifiable empirically. But the 
purpose of applying the model to a prospective case was to provide a 
series of hypothetical but likely situations and determine the evolu-
tionary paths for both the state and the group that would result in the 
most violence-prone confrontations. As such, the model proved 
useful in illustrating the "dangerous dyads." 
Finally, the model was designed to structure intelligence analysis, 
trace the logical connections in the evolution of tensions along 
interethnic lines, and provide a framework for thinking of potential 
outcomes to hypothetical situations. Outlining specific trends for 
analysts to track-on the basis of their potential for violence-is the 
goal of the exercise. The model is a tool toward that end, as it pro-
vides the all-important linkage between goals, level of resources, and 
the resulting strategies and choices open to the state and the group. 
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AFTERWORD 
In May 1998, war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The war 
was ostensibly over a small patch ofland on the border of Eritrea and 
the Ethiopian state of Tigray. However, the armed conflict was pre-
cipitated by economic friction between the two countries that began 
when Eritrea (officially independent of Ethiopia from 1993) launched 
its own currency, the nafka, and demanded that all trade and 
exchange between the two countries be conducted in hard currency. 
This was a particularly burdensome request for Ethiopia, since it uses 
the Eritrean port of Assab to export many of its tractable goods. 
Fighting between the two countries continued for a few weeks before 
both the UN and the Organization for African Unity began to try to 
mediate some sort of peace agreement. These negotiations broke 
down, and conflict erupted again in February 1999. 
These events have reduced significantly the potential for ethnic 
conflict within Ethiopia. The ethnic divisions that were so pro-
nounced before the fighting broke out have receded with the appear-
ance of a new and external enemy. Ethnic divisions within Ethiopia, 
and ethnic divisions between Ethiopian groups outside of the coun-
try, have become muted as nationalist sentiment is generated by the 
war. It is unclear whether or not the war will have a long-term posi-
tive effect on the possibility of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. The length 
of the war, its outcome, and subsequent government policies will all 
play a role in determining the eventual result. The length in particu-
lar will be important. As the war drags on, the elections of 2000 may 
be far less contentious than previous elections. But when the war 
ends, the country could be back to ethnic politics as usual and the 
scenarios documented herein will be as relevant as ever. 
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ANNEX: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
ETHIOPIA IN 1997-1998 
The following information about population characteristics is based 
upon the situation in Ethiopia at the beginning of 1998. The infor-
mation presented here is the basic reference for the analysis in this 
chapter. 
Name: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
Capital: Addis Ababa. 
Nature of government: Nominally parliamentary democratic system 
in a federal state with a strong federal prime minister and substantial 
local powers held by the regions. The federal parliament consists of 
two chambers: the Council of People's Representatives (the lower 
chamber) and the Council of the Federation (the upper chamber). 
The lower chamber has lawmaking functions and consists of 548 
directly elected deputies. The upper chamber is responsible for 
reviewing constitutional and regional issues and has 117 deputies 
chosen by assemblies in each region. Judges of the Supreme Court 
are elected by the legislature. 
Organization of the state: A federal state, with nine ethnically based 
administrative regions and two cities with regional status: the 
federal capital region of Addis Ababa, and Harar. The regions are 
Afar, Amhara, Benshangul/Gumaz, Gambela, Oromia, Somalia, 
Southern People's Region, Nationalities and Peoples, and Tigray. 
Two of the regions (Southern People's Region and Nationalities and 
Peoples) contain several small ethnic groups and are defined as terri-
torially defined amalgamations of ethnic groups. 
Date of constitution: December 1994 (in effect since August 1995). 
Population: 58.7 million (estimate, July 1997). 
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Major ethnic groups: Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan. Dozens of ethnic 
groups exist in Ethiopia; classification of the population along ethnic 
lines is difficult because of the variety of determinants of ethnicity, 
such as language, religion, region, and historical experience. Some 
ethnic groups may share a language and/ or religion. 
Languages: Major languages are Amharic (official language), 
Tigrinya, Oromiffa, Guaraginga, Somali, Arabic, English. More than 
seventy languages are spoken in Ethiopia, most of them belonging to 
three families of the Afro-Asiatic language group: Semitic (Ethio-
Semitic and Arabic branches), Cushitic, and Omotic. A small portion 
of the population (approximately 2 percent) are native speakers of 
language families belonging to the Nila-Saharan language group: 
East Sudanic, Koman, Berta, and Kunema. The principal languages 
within the Ethio-Semitic group are Amharic and Tigrinya. Of the var-
ious Cushitic languages (subdivided into Highland and Lowland East 
Cushitic, Central Cushitic, and Northern Cushitic), Orominga and 
Somali are the most numerous. Weleyta are the most numerous 
speakers of the Omotic language group. 
Religions: Islam, Orthodox Christianity, animism. (Catholicism and 
Protestantism also present.) 
Population statistics: Because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate 
population statistics, the data presented here should be interpreted 
as approximations. The sometimes wide variance in estimates 
means that percentages of the total population-according to reli-
gious or linguistic differences-are more significant than the abso-
lute figures. 
Some Oromo factions believe the government grossly underesti-
mates the Oromo population and land claims. They claim traditional 
lands north of Addis Ababa and south to the Kenyan border. These 
factions are correct insofar as particular "Oromo" groups have been 
classified by their subgroup (such as the Borana, who are Oromiffa 
speakers and considered part of the larger Oromo people, but whom 
the government defines as Borana). However, not surprisingly, the 
Oromo idea of a "Greater Oromia" suffers from its own shortcom-
ings. For example, some Oromos claim that Addis Ababa, Debre 
Berhan, and Tegulet and Bulga are traditional Oromo lands, over-
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looking the fact that non-Oromo indigenous populations in some of 
these areas exceed 50 percent. 
The Christian and Muslim populations of Ethiopia are generally 
mixed, but we can make some cursory generalizations about their 
regional distribution. The population to the north of Addis Ababa, 
on the highland plateau, is predominantly Orthodox Christian. The 
population to the south of Addis Ababa in the Rift Valley and east 
tends to be Muslim, and people west of the Rift Valley are Christian. 
Animist practices are found among the pastoralists inhabiting the far 
south of the country and scattered throughout the south. Amhara 
Table5.9 
Population ofEthiopia by Ethnicity 
Ethnic Group 
Oro mo 
Am hara 
Ti gray 
Sidamo 
Shankella 
Somali 
Afar 
Gurage 
Others 
Percent of Population, 
CIA World Factbook 
40a 
32 
9 
6 
6 
4 
2 
Percent of Population, 
Library of Congress 
40a 
30 
15 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
15 
aoromo groups estimate their numbers at 50-60 percent of the total 
population. Feyise Demi, "The Oromo Population and the Politics of 
Numbers in Ethiopia," The Oromo Commentary, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996. 
Religion 
Orthodox Christian 
Muslim 
Animist 
Protestant/Catholic 
Other 
Table5.10 
Religion Statistics 
Percent of Population, 
CIA World Factbook 
35-40 
45-50 
12 
NA 
3-8 
Percent of Population, 
Library of Congress 
50 
40 
NA 
2 
NA 
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and Tigrinya speakers predominate in northern Ethiopia and in the 
cities. Ororno speakers can be found throughout the south and west 
of Ethiopia, with a large concentration in Addis Ababa. 
Table5.ll 
Population ofEthiopia by Language Group 
Speakers Percent of 
Ethnic Group (millions) Population 
Am hara 15 28.5 
Oro mo 14 26.6 
Ti gray 4 7.6 
Weleyta 2 3.8 
Somali 2 3.8 
Gurage 1.5 2.9 
Hadiya 1.9 
Kembata 1 1.9 
Afar 0.5 1.0 
Harari (Aderi) 0.03 0.06 
SOURCE: Ethnologue, 13th Edition, Barbara F. Grimes (ed.). 
Summer Institute of Linguistics, Inc., 1996. 
